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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Third Circuit Court granting Defendant 
David P. Adams', Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff, 
Vernon J. Thomas' claim. The Order was signed by the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
on January 22, 1990. The Court of Appeals for the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear 
and decide this appeal pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Art. VII, § 1 and § 5; Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(c) (1953), as amended; and Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 
4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the original Complaint filed by Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, against 
Defendant David P. Adams constitutes an insurance subrogation claim pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-2M08 and § 31A-22-309. The standard for review is that in deciding 
whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing 
party, the Court of Appeals should give no deference to the trial court's view of the law; 
but must review it for correctness. Utah State Coal of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L. 776 P.2d 632, 
634 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether Summary Judgment was appropriately granted pursuant to Judge 
Hutchings finding that the Complaint was an attempt at a subrogation claim and therefore 
the wrong parties were listed in the Complaint and the parties were required to engage in 
arbitration prior to suit. The standard for review is the same as in the first issue stated. 
Where no material facts remain unresolved, the Court must examine the trial court's 
conclusions of law and review them for correctness. English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 
(Utah App. 1989). 
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STATUTES 
Interpretation of the following two statutes is determinative of the aforementioned 
issues in this case: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986). Subrogation Actions. Subrogation 
actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1986). Every policy providing personal 
injury protection coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person 
to whom benefits required under personal injury protection 
then paid by another insured, including the Worker's 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who 
would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer 
for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its 
amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND DISPOSITION 
On October 9, 1989, the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, filed a Complaint against the 
Defendant, David P. Adams, alleging that the Defendant negligently and carelessly caused 
his motor vehicle to collide with the vehicle owned by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs Complaint 
states that as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and carelessness, 
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff prayed for judgment against the Defendant in the 
sum of $3,000.00. See Complaint, p. 1 and p. 2, Exhibit A. In Mr. Thomas' Appellate 
Brief, it is stated that his insurer, Allstate Insurance Co. brought a subrogation suit against 
Defendant's insurer. This is not the case. Nowhere in the Complaint is Allstate Insurance 
referenced nor is Defendant's insurer. Also, there is no indication in the Complaint that 
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the suit was to be a subrogation suit for PIP reimbursement. It is merely presented as a 
negligence action between individual parties. 
On November 10, 1989, the Defendant, Mr. Adams, answered Plaintiffs Complaint 
setting forth as a Fourth Defense that Plaintiff had executed a release of all claims dated 
August 9, 1989, and that, therefore, Plaintiffs claim was barred. See Answer, p. 1 and p. 
2, and Release of All Claims, Exhibits B and C. 
On November 17, 1989, the Defendant, David P. Adams, filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, responded by filing a Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on November 27,1989. It was 
in this Memorandum that Plaintiff, for the first time, indicated that the Complaint was, 
although not alleged, really a subrogation case for PIP reimbursement pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1953), as amended. See Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 2, Exhibit 
D. 
On January 22, 1990, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings granted Mr. Adams' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. His reasons for 
dismissing the case were that: (1) This is a subrogation claim and should be decided by 
arbitration, and (2) the proper parties are insurance companies. See Order, p. 1, Exhibit 
E. The Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, has appealed this decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts recited in Appellant's Brief, the following additional facts 
are pertinent to the issues before the Court and will clarify what is misleading in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. It is true that on December 14, 1987, the Plaintiff, Vernon 
J. Thomas, and the Defendant, David P. Adams, were involved in a motor vehicle accident 
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in Salt Lake City. Mr. Adams did in fact reimburse Mr. Thomas for damage to his vehicle. 
It is also a fact that Plaintiff suffered a heart attack some time after the accident. However, 
it is not a fact that Plaintiffs heart attack was a direct and proximate result of the accident, 
and, there is no evidence to prove this. 
At the time of the accident Plaintiff was insured by Allstate Insurance Company 
and Defendant was insured by Vanliner Insurance Company. See Release of All Claims, 
Exhibit C. On January 12, 1988, Allstate Insurance Company sent an inter-insurer 
subrogation memorandum to Frontier Adjusters (representing Vanliner Insurance Company) 
requesting payment for repairs to Mr. Thomas' vehicle in the amount of $1609.00. This was 
paid by Frontier Adjusters. See Inter-Insurer Memo, Exhibit F. The subrogation 
memorandum also indicated that medical expenses were pending for Vernon Thomas and 
Huetta Thomas. Mr. Thomas' medical expenses were related to a heart attack which he 
suffered as a result of coronary artery disease. 
On August 9, 1989, Vernon Thomas represented by Phillip C. Story, Jr. signed a 
release discharging Mr. Adams, A&M Moving & Storage, Inc., and Transprotection 
Insurance Company and Vanliner Insurance Company from any liability related to the 
accident, in consideration of the payment to Mr. Thomas of $5,000.00. 
On April 4, 1988, Peter Stirba representing Vanliner Insurance Company and A&M 
Moving & Storage sent a letter to Allstate regarding its Subrogation Memorandum and 
stating that "Allstate's claim for medical expenses relating to Mr. Thomas' heart attack did 
not arise out of the accident and therefore the claim submitted to Frontier Adjusters was 
denied." See letter, Exhibit G. There was no mention of arbitration nor was arbitration 
refused by Mr. Adams' insurer. 
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On April 12, 1988, Allstate sent a letter to Mr. Stirba stating that it was one doctor's 
opinion that the accident precipitated Mr. Thomas' heart attack by aggravating his 
preexisting coronary artery disease. See letter, Exhibit H. Allstate also stated that it had 
covered Mr. Thomas' medical expenses because of this doctor's opinion. Again, there was 
no request for arbitration nor was a subrogation suit discussed in this letter. Appellant's 
characterization of this letter is incorrect. Even the copy Appellant has attached to his 
Brief does not state that Allstate was "expressly indicating its intent to file suit should the 
insurer prove not to be a member of the inter-company arbitration." See Appellant's Brief, 
p. 4 and attached letter. This letter did not call for a response and, therefore, none was 
made. 
On October 9, 1989, the Complaint was filed by Mr. Thomas against Mr. Adams 
in Circuit Court, State of Utah, for negligence in the amount of $3,000.00 for medical 
expenses suffered by Mr. Thomas relating to his heart attack. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The original Complaint filed in this matter, as pled, was a negligence action by 
the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, against the Defendant, David P. Adams, and nothing 
more. There is no mention in that Complaint of subrogation or insurance companies. 
The Complaint, as it was pled was a simple negligence action between individual parties 
and since both parties had already signed a release of all claims relating to the accident, 
the Complaint was barred. 
2. If the intent of Plaintiff was to bring a subrogation claim, the Circuit Court below 
was correct in granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following 
two reasons. First, the Complaint, as a subrogation action, named the wrong parties and 
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was not pled in the names of the proper parties, the insurance companies. Secondly, 
binding arbitration is statutorily required to determine the issue of liability for 
reimbursement of PIP benefits often paid by one insurance company which it is claimed is 
owed by another. Allstate has not attempted to pursue arbitration. 
INTRODUCTION 
The standard for appellate review requires that this Court look only to facts which 
were in the record below. Plaintiff/Appellant has argued several facts for the first time on 
appeal and Defendant/Appellee would like to address the Court's attention to the 
impropriety of this. The record below consists of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant's answer, 
Defendant's Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition and Defendant's Reply Memorandum. The Release of all Claims was also 
made a part of the record. 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Thomas now seeks to introduce new facts and evidence to this 
Court for review. Mr. Thomas has included an Inter-Insurer Subrogation Memorandum, 
a letter to Allstate from Peter Stirba and a letter to Mr. Stirba from Allstate (although not 
signed by Allstate) with his Brief. Mr. Adams submits that this is improper and that these 
items should be disregarded by the Court on review. 
ARGUMENTS 
A, The Original Complaint as Pled Was a Negligence Claim Between Individuals 
Although Allstate Insurance Company seems to be the party appealing the lower 
court ruling the fact is that the original Plaintiff was Vernon J. Thomas. There is not one 
single allegation in the Complaint referencing that the action below was a subrogation 
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action. There was not one single allegation in the Complaint indicating that, although the 
suit was brought in the name of Vernon Thomas, it was really Allstate Insurance Company 
who was suing as a subrogation claim. Furthermore, the matter was brought against the 
Defendant David P. Adams, the driver who was involved in the accident, rather than against 
his insurance carrier. There is no question that if the case was in fact a subrogation action 
for the reimbursement of PIP benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1953), as 
amended, the proper party to the lawsuit would have been Defendant's insurance carrier 
not Defendant individually. 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Thomas, continues to reference the following statute which states: 
"Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured. Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986) The Defendant agrees that this statute is relevant generally to 
subrogation actions. However, this is a very specific subrogation action for the 
reimbursement of very specific benefits, i.e. PIP benefits. The controlling statute is Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1953), as amended. The original pleading by Plaintiff in this 
action was faulty for two reasons. First, there was no mention made that the claim against 
the Defendant was subrogation action. Second, under the PIP reimbursement statute, "the 
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for 
payment...," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) (1953), as amended. The statute which 
applies to this action is the specific subrogation statute relating to reimbursement for PIP 
benefits. It does not allow Allstate to bring an action against an insurer in the name of its 
insured, nor does it allow Allstate to sue an individual for reimbursement rather than the 
insurer. 
It is clear that the original claim was not intended to be a subrogation action. After 
Allstate became aware that its insured had already signed a release with the Defendant, the 
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intent of Allstate to bring a subrogation action arose. This is why the release which was 
signed by the original parties is so important to this matter. The release was signed by 
Vernon J. Thomas with representation by his attorney and by David P. Adams, the 
Defendant, in consideration of $5,000.00. This amount was paid to Mr. Thomas for the 
release of the claim. Therefore, there can be no claim of negligence by Vernon J. Thomas 
against David P. Adams and therefore, the release is dispositive of the original Complaint. 
It was one month after the original Complaint had been filed when Allstate became aware 
of the release and that the Complaint, as pled, would be barred by the release. It was only 
then that Allstate began insisting that the original Complaint was a subrogation action 
between the insurance carriers. 
Thus, based upon the existing allegations in the Plaintiffs Complaint, the release 
signed by the Plaintiff is dispositive of the case. The case as pled was not a subrogation 
case and there was absolutely no reference in the Complaint to suggest that it was. Merely 
because Allstate began calling the Complaint a subrogation claim, does not make it so. 
B. If The Complaint Is To Be Construed As a Subrogation Claim. The Circuit Court Was 
Correct In Granting Summary Judgment 
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs Complaint should be construed differently than 
what has been alleged, that the Complaint is a subrogation claim for PIP reimbursement, 
then the Circuit Court was correct in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the grounds that the Complaint named the wrong parties and, under the statute, 
the Plaintiff did not attempt to arbitrate the claim prior to suit. The express language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6), (1988). requires that the claim be dismissed. Section 
31A-22-309(6) states in pertinent part as follows: 
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(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject 
to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injury sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under person injury protection have been paid by another insurer, 
including the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person 
who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Complaint was deficient and flawed in two major 
ways as was pointed out by Judge Hutchings and the Court below. 
First, Plaintiff has failed to name the proper parties. In a subrogation action for 
PIP reimbursement, according to the statute, the insurer or the person liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer. Thus, even if there is a subrogation claim, it is between 
insurers and the proper party Plaintiff is Allstate and the proper party Defendant is Mr. 
Adams' insurer. The statute, which Plaintiff continues to cite as determinative of this issue, 
does not give the insurer in a PIP reimbursement claim the right to sue in the name of its 
insurer. The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986) does not apply to this type of 
subrogation claim. If it did, there would be no reason for the express language of the PIP 
statute. Therefore, as the Circuit Court properly found, the claim has been brought in the 
name of incorrect parties and, therefore, Judge Hutchings decision dismissing the action 
with prejudice is correct. 
Mr. Thomas cites several cases for the proposition that "these provisions both 
embodied in the Insurance Code, must be construed harmoniously absent repeal or 
amendment of either." The first case, Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), 
had nothing to do with the Insurance Code. The case does, however, cite a general rule 
of statutory construction that, "if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new 
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provision and the prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision will 
control as it is the later expression of the legislature." Id., at 1318. Accordingly, the newer 
and more specific statute would be the one to control here, as it reflects the expression of 
the legislature with regard to subrogation actions for PIP reimbursement. Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980), also has nothing to do with the Insurance 
Code and provides no assistance in interpreting these statutes. 
Second, the subrogation action or liability that is being asserted for PIP 
reimbursement, according to the No Fault PIP reimbursement statute, must be decided by 
"mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(b) 
(1988). That being the case, the Circuit Court below was entirely correct in dismissing the 
action because there has been no binding arbitration between the insurers. Allstate has 
never initiated arbitration proceedings. Plaintiff has had opportunities to correct the errors 
in its Complaint and also to request arbitration, but has done neither. 
In Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thomas makes the following allegations; "arbitration has 
become impossible," "Defendant's insurer refused to participate in the required arbitration," 
"Frontier Adjusters refused to respond to Allstate's arbitration inquiries," and "Allstate's 
failure to initiate arbitration proceedings was justified where such action clearly would be 
futile." All of these statements made in Appellant's Brief are false, not to mention the fact 
that these issues were first raised on appeal. Mr. Adams objects to the issues above being 
reviewed by this Court and suggests that they are irrelevant for the following reasons. 
At no time was Vanliner Insurance Company or Frontier Adjusters ever asked to 
participate in a binding arbitration with Allstate. Frontier Adjusters, by letter of counsel 
on April 4, 1988, did refuse to pay a demand by Allstate for medical expenses incurred by 
Mr. Thomas as a result of his heart attack. The reason for this was that Frontier Adjusters 
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did not consider those expenses to be related to the automobile accident. There was no 
mention of arbitration and no refusal by Frontier Adjusters to arbitrate. Mr. Thomas 
suggests that a letter from Allstate dated April 12, 1988 stated that "If the carrier you 
represent is not a member of Inter Company Arbitration, we would have no option but to 
file suit to recover our costs." The letter attached to Mr. Thomas' brief does not say this, 
nor did the letter sent to Mr. Stirba. Frontier Adjusters did not respond to this letter as 
there was no response called for and, furthermore, the language of that letter was in no way 
an invitation to arbitrate the matter. 
Even after Judge Hutchings found that the claim had been brought in the name of 
improper parties and that a binding arbitration was required if this was in fact a subrogation 
claim, Plaintiff chose to appeal the matter to this Court rather than ask for arbitration. The 
statute itself states that arbitration is mandatory and therefore, Frontier Adjusters would 
not be able to refuse as Plaintiff insists they have. Plaintiff admits on page 8 of Appellant's 
Brief that it has "failed to initiate arbitration proceedings." Plaintiff goes on to state that 
its failure to initiate arbitration proceedings is justified because the action would "clearly 
be futile." If Plaintiff has never initiated any arbitration proceedings, how could Plaintiff 
possibly know that such arbitration would be futile. 
Mr. Thomas has improperly pled his claim. Judge Hutchings was correct in 
dismissing the claim as pled. The basis of Mr. Thomas' action is not within the review of 
this Court. Plaintiff has violated both statutes cited above by bringing the action in the 
names of improper parties and by failing to initiate mandatory arbitration proceedings with 
the insurer. Consequently, Judge Hutchings of the Third Circuit Court was entirely correct 
in dismissing the claim with prejudice and indicating that arbitration should be sought as 
11 
a remedy. Mr. Thomas, however, chose to appeal that decision rather than initiating 
arbitration with Mr. Adams' insurer. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the basic principles of appellate procedure is that an appellate court should 
review questions of law and may not substitute its own view of the facts or make new fact 
findings. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "a grant of Summary Judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P., 56(c); Utah State Coal of 
Senior Citizens v. UP&L. 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). This Court, in the above case, 
went on to note that in deciding whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a 
matter of law to the prevailing party, "We give no difference to the trial court's view of the 
law; we review it for correctness." Id, citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. 
Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1384-1385 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the Circuit Court below granted summary judgment as a matter of law to Mr. 
Adams. It is the standard of the Court of Appeals to review that judgment for its 
correctness as to the law. The Appellant has attempted to mislead the Court by asserting 
facts which are not in the record below and not within the purview of the Court of Appeals. 
For example, in Appellant's Brief, Appellant states that "Frontier Adjusters is neither based 
nor licensed to do business in Utah." See Appellant's Brief, p. 7. This fact is entirely 
incorrect and not present in the record anywhere below. Another example of Appellant's 
attempts to mislead the Court by asserting facts which are either completely false or not 
represented in the record below, is Allstate's repeated assertion that the Defendant has 
refused to arbitrate this matter. This statement is completely false and also is not present 
in any record below. Two of the Appellant's arguments are based on this misinterpretation 
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of the facts. The fact of the matter is that Vanliner Insurance Company and Frontier 
Adjusters are, and always have been, willing to arbitrate, but have never been asked to do 
so by Allstate. Since this fact is not in the record below and is the basis of two of the 
Appellant's arguments, these arguments should be summarily disregarded by the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is unclear what remedy the Appellant is seeking. Allstate has not indicated that 
jt would be willing to arbitrate this matter and Plaintiff has, in fact, chosen to appeal the 
lower court's determination rather than enter into arbitration with Vanliner Insurance Co.. 
Mr. Thomas argues that somehow Vanliner may, in the future, refuse to arbitrate. The 
statute is quite clear in stating that arbitration is mandatory. It appears that, should either 
party refuse to arbitrate there is a remedy for violation of the statute. Mr. Thomas has also 
made the argument that res judicata somehow applies here. Res judicata would only apply 
to a suit for the same negligence claim between the same parties. Allstate has a remedy. 
Allstate can file a subrogation action in the name of the insurers, pursuant to the statute 
if arbitration is unsuccessful. 
The ruling of the Circuit Court below was quite clear and simple. If Plaintiff was 
attempting to file a subrogation claim pursuant to the statutes cited above, it should have 
followed those statutes. While Section 31A-21-108 allows an insurer in a general insurance 
action to bring an action in the name of its insured, the section does not apply to 
subrogation claims for PIP reimbursement when there is a specific statute that does apply. 
In fact, the specific statute for automobile, PIP insurance claims and/or subrogation claims 
requires that "the insurer of a person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) (1953), as amended. 
The statute is quite clear. Plaintiff has failed to bring its subrogation action pursuant to 
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statute in the name of the proper parties. Therefore, the ruling of the Circuit Court below 
was correct. 
The Circuit Court below also ruled correctly that this action should be pursued in 
binding arbitration. The statute on this is also quite clear. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
309(b) states that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. By not requesting or 
initiating arbitration, Plaintiff has violated this statute. Plaintiff admits in his Brief that 
Allstate has never initiated arbitration with the Defendant's insurer. The Defendant's 
insurer has never refused to arbitrate and has always been ready, willing and able to do 
so upon request. The Circuit Court's ruling requiring arbitration is clearly pursuant to the 
statute and correct. 
The Defendant, David P. Adams, (Appellee), for the above stated reasons 
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals uphold the Circuit Court's Ruling granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs Claim with Prejudice. 
DATED this / / c l ay of July, 1990. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
JA 
BARBARA ZtMMERMAN 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFEND ANT/APPELLEE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the / / ""day of July, 1990, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
DON E. OLSEN 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT otiuz 
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ADDENDUM 
(A) Complaint 
(B) Answer 
(C) Release of All Claims 
(D) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
(E) Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(F) Inter-Insurer Subrogation Memorandum 
(G) Letter to Allstate Insurance Company from Peter Stirba, dated April 4, 1988 
(H) Letter to Peter Stirba from Allstate Insurance Company, dated April 12, 1988 
(I) Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2M07 (1953), as amended 
(J) Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1953), as amended 
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EXHIBIT A 
DON E. OLSEN #24G 
MATHESON, MORTENS 
Attorneys for Pla 
648 East First Sd 
Salt Lake City, q 
Telephone (801) 
EN & OLSEN 
intiff 
uth 
tah 84102 
63-2244 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT} LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
vs , 
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Plaintiff complains of Defendant and for cause of action 
alleges: 
1* That at all times pertinent hereunto,, Defendant was a 
resident of the State of Utah, and the amount in controversy is 
less than $10,000.00. 
2. At all times pertinent hereunto, Defendant, as a 
resident of the State of Utah, was operating a motor vehicle over 
and upon the highways of the State of Utah within the terms of 
Section 41-12a-SQ5, Utah Code Annotated, 1353 as amended, and 
Plaintiff is infoUraed and reasonably believes that Defendant has 
left the State of Utah and his last known address is as follows: 
David P. Adams 
19326 Fernwood Drive 
Cfllppewa Falls, Wisconsin 54729. 
3. On or abqut December 14, 1987, on a public street known 
as SR15, at or near 600 North structure, in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, Defendant negligently and carelessly caused a 
motor vehicle operated by her to collide with a vehicle owned by 
Plaintiff. 
4. As direcjt and proximate result of Defendant's negligence 
and carelessness aforesaid. Plaintiff suffered an heart attack 
occasioned by strJess brought on from collision, and has incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the sum of 
$3,000-00. 
5. Defendant has paid damage to Plaintiff's vehicle but has 
failed and refused to pay Plaintiff's medical expenses* 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant for the sum of $3,000*00 together with interest at the 
highest lawful rate from and after December 14, 1987, until date 
of judgment hereia, for Plaintiff's costs of court and such other 
relief as the Couat deems just. jfTt 
DATED this ft day of October, 1989. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN £ OLSEN 
Don E* Olsen 
2 
FXHIRITR 
PETER STIRBA (3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, : 
Plaintiff, : ANSWER 
-vs- : 
DAVID P. ADAMS, : Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
Defendant. 
Defendant answers plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's complaint, and each and every claim or cause 
of action asserted therein, fails to state a claim against 
defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant responds to the individual paragraphs of 
plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
1. Defendant is without sufficient information or 
tfelief as to the allegations of paragraph 1, and therefore 
denies the same. 
2. Admits the allegations in paragraph 2. 
3. Denies the allegations of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Any injury or damage sustained by plaintiff was solely 
caused or proximately contributed to by his own actual fault or 
by the actual fault of other persons who are not parties to this 
lawsuit, which fault is equal to or greater in degree than any 
actual conduct on the part of the defendant. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the execution of a 
Release of All Claims dated August 9, 1989, a copy of which is 
attached hereto. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered plaintiff's complaint, 
defendant demands that the same be dismissed, with prejudice, 
and that he be awarded his costs incurred herein, and such other 
relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this (cf* day of November, 1989. 
McKAY,/6ufcffON & ^ HURMAN 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERV^ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER was mailed, postage prepaid, this jQQ day of 
November, 1989, to the following: 
Don E. Olsen, Escj. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
PYHIRITC 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned 
of the total sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,000.00), 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, 
VERNON J. THOMAS and PHILIP C. STORY, JR., his attorney, hereby 
forever release and discharge DAVID P. ADAMS, A&M MOVING AND " 
STORAGE, INC., TRANSPROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY and VANLINER 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons, firms, or 
corporations, from and of any and all claims, demands, benefits 
either past or future, causes of action both for property damage, 
damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on 
account of or in any way growing out of an incident which oc-
curred on or about December 14, 1987, on Interstate 15, at or 
near Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The undersigned hereby declare and represent that the 
damages sustained by the undersigned are or may be permanent and 
progressive and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and 
indefinite and in making this release and agreement, it is 
understood and agreed that the undersigned rely wholly upon their 
own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and 
duration of said damages and in granting this complete release, 
they do not rely upon anything told to them or represented to 
them by the persons, firms or corporations who are being re-
leased, or by any person or persons representing them. 
The undersigned further understand and agree that this 
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and 
that payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of any of the persons or companies referred to above 
and who are released herein and by whom liability is expressly 
denied. 
The undersigned further acknowledge and accept the advice of 
counsel in the settlement of this matter that this is a full, 
complete and final release of the above-named parties for any 
matter or thing done or omitted to be done by the said parties 
and as a result of the incident referred to above. The under-
signed further represent that there are no unresolved subrogation 
claims and agree that if any such claims should be made, they 
will indemnify and save harmless those parties released hereby. 
The undersigned further states that they have carefully read 
the foregoing Release of All Claims, know the contents thereof 
and that they sign the same as their own free act, and it is 
their intention to be legally bound thereby. 
DATED this day of X- 9 1989 
Vernon J 
•Philip C. Story, Jr. 
Attorney for Vernon J. Thomas 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of S>oM U i ^ 
c On this day of 1989, personally 
appeared before (me VERNON J.' THOMAS, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowl-
edged that he executed the same w1 
DATED this _J day of 1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public ri / 
Residing at: _ _ _ 
EXfflfBlTD 
DON E. OLSEN #24 60 
KRIS C. LEONARD #4 902 
MATNESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
646 East EirfJt South 
Salt Lake Oityr Utah 34102 
Telephone: (301) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OR UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
) 
VERNON .7. THOMAS, ) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO 
4. By letter dated April 4, 1986, Defendant 
denied the sub r o g a t i o:'i c J. a i rri. 
5. On or ai.-out October 9, 1989, Plaintiff 
subject suit against the Defendant for the above-
e x n r e s s i v 
led trie 
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acts sno' 
defeat 
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effectiveness of the ?; 
based, requiring a den 
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:tov-i n a:e 
conu; n* 
*c i<;e n c 
;;'or; v;nicn 
Plaintj_f_f an assignment o f_rj^]ir S-. [On or about January 12, 1988, 
Allstate submitted to ^Defendant ' s\ employer's insurer, Frontier 
Ad j usters, its nc f au it subrogao ion c 1 a im eoncorninq the accident 
at issue, indicating its possession of "rights of subrogation for 
No-Fault benefit payments" f:r medical expenses. A copy of said 
claim is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
sparse :;o said claim. Plaintiff received from i*o :. or ence . i n 
r>, - r ,.....- J int 
deny iTig P1 a in 11r f ' s 
a 11 a c h c- d h e r e t o e 
dated April 4, 1986, expressly 
claim. A copy of said letter is 
"B" and incorporated herein by 
endant has failed and refused ±o 
J *Y l e t t e r d a t 
s o r - r u ^ . A p r i l 12 l e t 
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rr i t j 
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t h e r e a r e no u n r e s o l v e d 
; T; V S U C h c l a j TTIS S h O U 1 CI b e 
made-, they will indemnify and save harmless those parties 
released hereby." See Exhibit D. paragraph 4. 
The submission of Plaintiff's claim and Defendant's denial 
thereof, as outlined above, occurred more than nineteen months 
rrior to the execution of the subloot Release. Consequently, 
Defendant Yiad full knowledge and notice of Alls tat 
position more than nineteen mona h s pr ior to i15 
subroqation 
.:: (^  <_. rr < ) ^ CJ , i v, O (,'i. a 
r e l r c i s e s t a t i n a t h a t n o s u r n s a b r o g a t i o n c l a i m e x i s t e d . 
;-addition, Defendant was on notic 
A11 atote's e 1 aim as evidenced h• 
s u b mi 11 e d b y A11 s ta t e t o whi e 
Defendant's denial of Alist^f^* 
Defendant kn^w of the claim arei 
cod. looted payment from A1 J sf-:: • -;.-
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paragraph 4. Defendant's securing of and reliance on the Release 
obtained nineteen months after the submission of the claim raises 
an issue of material fact upon which trial must be had in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The peculiar circumstances of 
betondant's prior knowledge of the exist' 
subrogation claim nineteen months prior to obtaining the Role.? 
denying the exist one-*- oi: such cjaim. create a genuine issue 
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EXHIBIT 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
VERNON J. THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID P. ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 893010107CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
This matter was submitted to the Court for decision 
based upon the memoranda of the parties and the pleadings on 
file with the Court. The Court, having reviewed Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the entire file in this matter, 
and good cause appearing therefor, 
HEREEY ORDERS that Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted and this case is dismissed with 
preiudicXv 2 rtc&e^ l>TU^ & «• $Ato<\*ho-\» c(*t^ aMd^kot^d \^c 
DATED this ex 6^ <fay of January, 1990. ' \ 
BY THE COURT 
Michael L. Hutchings 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this /2 day of January, 1990, 
to the following: 
Don E. Olsen, Esq. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
•/ff. *WLuh, 
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EXHIBffF 
INTER-INSURER SUBROGATION MEMORANDUM 
FILE IDENTIFICATION:
 n A T F . J/hAf. / 2 , 11?8 
Your Claim No.: 13> I OOl JOC1 n . , r r . i a >mN n . : ^iDO^QOUl 
Your Insured: \tnr\rr} Cfa <>;„*<, . n,,r insured: V&rn/nn J- Thomas 
Your Insured's Address: * l //sii-fcc) Dntxs 
Accident: J' /g 
FcriTTOn /U1i<><OUfi „ 
(Place) (Date) 
ClyfrZ^Sj 7 ? Wz>G>&sfl_ 
J Q . niO°l S>.+tijhl*«d ^ 1024 
SLC UT" ZLJ/21 
L J 
R E G A R D I N G O U R S U B R O G A T I O N C L A I M A G A I N S T Y O U R C O M P A N Y . . . . 
I I 1. Repair or replacement of our insured's motor vehicle or other property is being made under the terms of our insured's 
policy. Our subrogation claim is forthcoming. Please protect Allstate's interests. 
F R O M ' <S A I , s t a * e l n s u r a n c e C o . 
r n u i V 1 ,
 U Allstate Indemnity Co. 
Q Al lstate County Mutual Ins. Co. [Texas only) 
MARKET CLAIM OFFICE 
5650 South 410 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84123-0000 
L 
Signature:. 
</ 
2. Our Investigation reveals that your insured was at fault for the accident, and: 
Pc 
pi 
fXa. ayment tor repairs to our Insured's motor vehicle (or other property J\ have been com-
^ pleted and documentation is attached. Please honor our claim: 
Allstate's interest: $ — [ S o l - ^
 P i e a s e s e n d a s e p a ra te draft for 
Insured's deductible (if indicated): $ IfY^ • — our insured's deductible O YesjS^No 
TOTAL: s //<,Q<1. ~ 
D b . Our insured's vehicle was a total loss. Documentation is attached. Basis for our claim: 
Amount paid to our insured: $ — — 
PLUS initial towing and storage charges: $. 
TOTAL (1) $. 
Gross recovery on sale of salvage: $ — 
LESS fees in sale of salvage: $ —— 
NET SALVAGE RECOVERY (2) $ -
Our subrogation interest (1 minus 2) $. 
PLUS our insured's deductible interest (if applicable): S. 
TOTAL SUBROGATION CLAIM: $. 
D c We possess rights of subrogation for Medical Expense Coverage payments. Documentation is attached. Please 
honor our claim for: ^ 
X l d . We possess rights of subrogation for No-Fault benefit payments. Documentation is attached. Please horor our 
claim for: \JcYr^ln i/^v^^'S 
Medical: s rtwy.Lr*: E s s ^ S e / v ^ ^ $ _ _ _ Surv. Loss: $ . 
Work Loss: $ J Funeral: $ _ _ _ TOTAL: $. 
I I 3. Following earlier correspondence to you regarding our subrogation claim, we incurred additional expense involving the 
loss. Documentation is attached. Please include the following amount in our subrogation claim: -
n 4. Our assessment of liability factors warrants a subrogation demand of less than 100%. In lieu of the amount shown in 2a or 
2b above, a % a compromised request is indicated as toUows: 
D Allstate's interest only: S 
D Allstate's interest including our insured's deductible interest: S 
I I 5. Documentation of our claim was sent to you earlier. Please remit payment. 
n 6. An arbitration decision in our favor was rendered on _. When may w | ^ x 0 6 c | ^ i ^ ^ n t j ? S 'f A 
n . i—AS i\Ul i n 
I I 7. Your offer of settlement is accepted. Please send your draft. 
LZI 8. Your offer of settlement is unacceptable. We will proceed with legal action (or arbitration if applicable) unless our demand 
is met within 20 days. 
EXHIBITG 
vviLFORD M B U R T O N 
B A P R I E G. MCKAY 
WILL IAM T. T H U R H A N 
DAVID P B R O W N 
W I L U A X T H O M A S T X U R M A N 
P E T E R ST1RBA 
DAVIO L BIRO 
R E I D TATEOKA 
S T E P H E N W RUPP 
H A R R Y C A S T O N 
BRYAN A. L A R S O N 
S C O T T C. PIERCE 
J O E L T. MARKER 
B E N S O N L HATHAWAY. JR. 
R. B R E T J E N K I N S 
MCKAY, B U R T O N & THURMAN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AND C O U N S E L O R S AT LAW 
SUITE 1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133 
(SOD 521-4135 
A p r i l A, 1988 
O f COUNSEL 
DAVID L MCKAY 
TELEFAX 801-521-4252 
Allstate Insurance Company 
Market Claim Office 
5650 South 410 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-0000 
Attention: Andra N. Hogan 
Re: Subrogation Claim/Vernon J, 
Thomas 
Dear Ms. Hogan: 
I have reviewed Allstate's no fault subrogation claim with 
the carrier for A S M Moving & Storage. Inasmuch as it is our 
position that your insured's injuries did not arise out of the 
accident, for which no fault benefits were provided, your claim 
previously submitted to Frontier Adjusters is denied. 
Very truly yours, 
PETER STIRBA 
/ < P 
P S l : k p 
cc: Libby Lovther 
Fave Sc roche r s 
IT 
SUa/ \ i S 4 
• r H 8 
C O P Y EXHIBITH 
A p r i l 12 , 1988 
Mr. Peter Stirba 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg. 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
• & ' C c 
RE: Our Claim Number 
Our Insured 
Accident Date 
Your Client 
1310092067 J30 
Vernon J. Thomas 
December 14, 1987 
Frontier Adjusting fo: 
A&M Moving & Storage 
Dear Mr* Stirba: 
Thank vou for vour corresoondence OJ 1988. 
While I can appreciate your concerns regarding the related-
ness of the heart surgery to the automobile accident, the 
matter was carefully and fully investigated prior to any 
payments being made. 
Enclosed is another copy of Dr. Okawa1s January 12, 1988 
medical report when he states "I feel definitely that the 
accident did precipitate his (Vernon J. Thomas) myocardial 
infarction, aggravating a pre-existing condition44. I had 
a long conversation with Dr. Okawa during which he strongly 
reiterated his assessment that had the accident not occur-
red, Mr. Thomas would have remained asymptomatic and treat-
ment for his coronary artery disease would not have been 
necessary. 
Dr. Okawa firmly established the relationship between the 
resialting treatment and the auto accident. Once the corre-
lation was made, we had no option but to cover the reasona-
ble and necessary expenses under Mr. Thomas1 personal injury 
protection coveraae. 
c_ 
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PYHIRIT 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 31A-21-108 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S . — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 281. 
Key Numbers. — Insurance «=» 144(1). 
31A-21-107. Contract rights under noncomplying poli-
cies, 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by this title, a policy is 
enforceable against the insurer according to its terms, even if it exceeds the 
authority of the insurer. 
(2) Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after July 1,1986, 
and which is otherwise valid, which contains any condition or provision not 
in compliance with the requirements of this title, is not rendered invalid by 
this title. However, those conditions and provisions shall be construed and 
applied as if the policy, rider, or endorsement was in full compliance with 
this title. 
(3) Upon written request of the policyholder or an insured whose rights 
under the policy are continuing and not transitory, an insurer shall reform 
and reissue or amend by a clearly stated rider its written policy to comply 
with the requirements of the law existing at the date of issuance of the 
policy. Subject to this section and § 31A-21-102, a person seeking to reform 
a written insurance agreement by complaint or petition to a judicial au-
thority shall show by clear and convincing evidence the existence of facts 
establishing the reformation. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-2M07, enacted by section (3), deleted from the end of the first 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; L. 1986, ch. 204, sentence "or if proved by clear and convinc-
§ 140. ing evidence, to comply with the prior agree-
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
 m e nt of the parties" and added the present 
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection last sentence. 
(2), substituted "title" for "code"; and in Sub-
31A-21-108. Subrogation actions. 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its 
insured. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-2M08, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, ch. 204, 
L. 1986, ch. 204, § 141. § 299 makes the act effective on July 1,1986. 
341 
31A-22-309 INSURANCE CODE T XHIBIT J 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by the use or operation of the named insured's 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9. own motor vehicle not actually insured under 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the policy" for "and" in Subsection (1) and "un-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the for- der the circumstances described in Section (1), 
merly undivided language in Subsection (1) except where the person is injured as a result 
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesig- of the use or operation of his own motor vehicle 
nated former Subsection (2) as present Subsec- not insured under the policy; and" for "when 
tion (3); substituted "when injured in an acci- injured in an. accident in Utah involving any 
dent involving any motor vehicle, regardless of motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Sub-
whether the accident occurs in this state, the section (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first in-
United States, its territories or possessions, or stance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring 
Canada, except when the injury is a result of in Utah" near the end of the subsection. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Limitation of policy covering driver. to personal injury protection (PIP) coverage 
Father of passenger, who was killed while under a policy covering the driver. McCaffery 
riding in an automobile driven by insured's son v. Grow, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 
but owned by another person, was not entitled 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in- coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to per-
sonal injury protection. 
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy which includes 
personal injury protection may maintain a cause of action for general dam-
ages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an auto-
mobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the 
following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehi-
cle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition inci-
dent to any of the foregoing; or 
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(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 
are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensa-
tion or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty 
in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are 
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reason-
able proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported 
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is 
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is 
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days 
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the ex-
penses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1-1/2% per 
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another in-
surer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by added Subsections (2)(a)(iv) to (vi) and made 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; related stylistic changes, and substituted "is 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10. subject to the following" for "shall provide" in 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 (2nd S.S.) the introductory language of Subsection (6). 
amendment, effective September 5, 1988, 
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NOTES TO PECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Household exclusion clause. 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
Household exclusion clause. 
A household or family exclusion clause in an 
automobile insurance policy is contrary to pub-
lic policy and to the statutory requirements 
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the 
minimum benefits provided by statute. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985). 
Where the insurer fails to disclose material 
exclusions in an automobile insurance policy 
and the purchaser is not informed of them in 
writing, those exclusions are invalid. Without 
disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails 
to honor the reasonable expectations of the 
purchaser, rendering the exclusion clause in-
valid as to the entire policy limits. Farmers 
Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
Household or family exclusions are valid in 
this state as to insurance provided by an auto-
mobile policy in excess of the statutorily man-
dated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1987). 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsec-
tion (6), the individual who initially pays the 
amounts for which personal injury protection 
benefits are also available must be "another 
insurer." McCaffery v. Grow, 128 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitra-
tion between an iiininsured victim's father and 
another's insurance company. McCaffery v. 
Grow, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, The Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New Cause 
of Action in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 571. 
A.L.R. — Injury or death caused by assault 
as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle 
insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 1010. 
Who is "employed or engaged in the automo-
bile business" within exclusionary clause of li-
ability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting 
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance pol-
icy, or statute mandating insurance coverage, 
59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan. 
(1) After consultation with insurers authorized to issue policies containing 
the provisions specified under Section 31A-22-302, the insurance commis-
sioner shall approve a reasonable plan for the equitable apportionment among 
the insurers of applicants for those policies who are in good faith entitled to, 
but are unable to procure, these policies through ordinary methods. 
(2) Upon the commissioner's approval of a plan under this section, all in-
surers issuing policies described under Section 31A-22-302 shall subscribe to 
and participate in the commissioner's approved plan. 
(3) Any applicant for a policy under the commissioner's plan, any person 
insured under the plan, and any insurer affected by the commissioner's plan 
may appeal to the insurance commissioner from any ruling or decision of the 
manager or committee designated to operate the plan. 
(4) Section 31A-2-306 applies to the commissioner's decision on this appeal. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-310, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 161, § 82. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, designated 
the previously undesignated provisions of this 
section and, in Subsection (3), deleted "under 
Subsection 31A-2-30K3)" following ''insurance 
commissioner." 
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